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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JON TRIESAULT, ELIZABETH 
TRIESAULT, ROGER CLIVE BAKER 
and LYNNETTE JENNIFER BAKER, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
QMF, INC., WILLIAM E. CASPER, 
JR., SHIRLEY A. CASPER, 
GEORGE G. WRIGHT, JANE C. 
WRIGHT, et al., 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Case No. 970274-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction was conferred on the Utah Supreme Court by Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1996). The appeal was timely. The Order 
of Dismissal appealed from was initially entered May 28, 1996 (R. 
809-806), and amended December 10, 1996. (R. 912-910). No motions 
were filed under Rules 50(a) or (b) , 52(b), or 59 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Two motions seeking reconsideration (autho-
rized by Rule 54(b)) were filed. The first was filed April 12, 
1996 (R. 765-763), and denied by the Order of Dismissal dated May 
28, 1996. The second Rule 54(b) motion was filed August 16, 1996 
(R. 826-825), and denied by the Order of Dismissal dated December 
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10, 1996. Because of a pending counterclaim which was first 
dismissed as part of the December 10, 1996, order, the May 28, 
1996, dismissal did not become final until December 10, 1996. 
By order entered January 9, 1997, the trial court granted 
plaintiffs7 ex parte motion for extension of time to appeal, and 
granted a 30 day extension of time. (R. 920-918.) Plaintiffs filed 
their notice of appeal on Monday, February 10, 1997. (R. 923-921.) 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1997). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did Triesaults have standing to bring their claims that 
they were fraudulently induced to purchase a lot in the PUD? This 
issue was addressed below in plaintiffs' Rule 54(b) Motion for 
Order Vacating Dismissal of Personal Claims. (R. 826-825.) 
2. Did plaintiffs, who were each members of a planned unit 
development and who were each personally affected by the loss of 
prime common area, have standing to challenge the sale of part of 
the PUD common area? This issue was addressed in Plaintiffs7 
Motion to Determine Standing or, in the Alternative, for Leave to 
Join Additional Parties. (R. 618-617.) 
3. Did plaintiffs waive their personal claims (that 
Triesaults were fraudulently induced to sign a quit claim deed and 
Bakers were fraudulently induced to sign the amended PUD plat) by 
stating that their goal in the lawsuit was not to profit person-
ally, but to seek the return of the common ground or its value to 
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the homeowners association? This issue was addressed below in 
plaintiffs' Rule 54(b) Motion for Order Vacating Dismissal of 
personal Claims. (R. 826-825.) 
4. Where the applicable statute and contract required a vote 
of three-fourths of the property owners of a planned unit develop-
ment before selling off a parcel of the common ground, but where no 
owners' meeting was held nor a vote ever taken, did the trial court 
err in holding that such approval was effectively given because at 
least three-fourths of the members stated by affidavit that they 
did not wish to join in plaintiffs' challenge of the sale of the 
common area? This issue was suggested in Wrights' memorandum 
opposing plaintiffs' motion to reconsider (R. 788) and was 
addressed at oral arguments. 
The trial court decided this case by summary judgment, and its 
ruling is reviewed for correctness, with no deference to the trial 
court. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 
1989); Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 
1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES OR RULES. 
Appellants are not aware of any statutes, rules or cases which 
are solely determinative of the issues stated. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case. This is an appeal from a final 
judgment in a civil case. The lawsuit sought rescission or damages 
arising from a real estate transaction. 
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B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. Plaintiffs 
filed their complaint on March 10, 1995. (R. 24-1.l) The complaint 
named as defendants the Wrights and QMF, Inc. (sometimes jointly 
referred to in this brief as "Wrights") , and the Caspers. Among 
other things, the complaint sought an order restoring certain real 
property to a planned unit development, and an award of damages 
related to the loss of the property. Plaintiffs also filed a lis 
pendens. (R. 26-25.) On June 21, 1995, the parties filed a 
stipulation dismissing the claim for restoration of the real 
property. (R. 70-68.) Plaintiffs also released their lis pendens 
against the property. (R. 72-71.) An Order of Partial Dismissal 
was entered June 29, 1995. (R. 75-73.) 
Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment (R. 79-78) and 
supporting memorandum (R. 171-080) on July 14, 1995. Wrights 
responded to the motion (R. 191-185) and filed their own motion for 
summary judgment. (R. 355-354.) Caspers also responded to the 
motion. (R. 507-475.) Following oral argument, the trial court 
(Judge Lynn Davis) ordered the parties to provide further briefs on 
whether plaintiffs had standing. (R. 536.) Caspers then filed a 
motion for summary judgment which included arguments on standing. 
(R. 559-558.) Wrights filed a memorandum on the issue. (R. 555-
557.) Plaintiffs filed a motion to have the court determine that 
The documents in the trial court record are organized in 
reverse chronological order, with the result that the index page 
numbers on each document run in reverse order. 
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plaintiffs had standing or alternatively to grant leave to join 
additional parties. (R. 618-617.) 
On January 24, 1996, the trial court (Judge Lynn Davis) ruled 
that plaintiffs lacked standing, and that the case would be 
dismissed without prejudice unless the plaintiffs within 30 days 
joined the homeowners association or the other homeowners. (R. 647-
645.) Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on February 23, 1996, 
naming the other homeowners and the homeowners association as 
additional defendants. (R. 730-696.) Wrights (R. 736-731) and 
Caspers (741-737) answered the amended complaint. 
As part of the regular rotation of cases in the Fourth 
District, the case was assigned to Judge Donald Eyre. On April 4, 
1996, Judge Eyre ruled on Caspers' motion for summary judgment. 
Apparently unaware that plaintiffs had filed an amended complaint, 
Judge Eyre stated the action was dismissed without prejudice 
because plaintiffs had failed to join additional parties. Judge 
Eyre also noted that Judge Davis had allowed for joinder of either 
the homeowners association or the homeowners, but expressed his 
opinion that joinder of the homeowners association would be more 
appropriate. (R. 762-760.) 
Plaintiffs sought reconsideration of the dismissal on the 
ground that Judge Eyre was obviously unaware plaintiffs had filed 
an amended complaint. (R. 756-763.) Wrights opposed the reconsid-
eration and submitted affidavits from several homeowners stating 
they did not want to be part of any lawsuit. (R. 791-773.) On May 
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7, 1996, Judge Eyre granted the motion to reconsider, but 
nonetheless ordered the case dismissed. The court held that only 
the homeowners association had standing to pursue the claims, and 
that the affidavits of a majority of the homeowners precluded the 
homeowners association from being named as a party to pursue the 
claims. (R. 796-792.) An order of dismissal prepared by Wrights 
counsel and dismissing plaintiffs7 case with prejudice2 was entered 
May 28, 1996. (R. 809-806.) 
On September 1, 1995, without seeking prior leave of court, 
Wrights had filed a counterclaim against plaintiffs claiming 
slander of title and other damages. (R. 346-343.) The court 
subsequently granted leave to file the counterclaim. (R. 655.) On 
August 19, 1996, plaintiffs, through new counsel, filed a motion 
for summary judgment against the counterclaim. (R. 839-838.) 
Plaintiffs also sought an order vacating the dismissal of their 
personal claims. (R. 826-825.) Following argument, the trial court 
reaffirmed the dismissal of all plaintiffs' claims, but ordered 
that the dismissal be without prejudice. The court also granted 
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment dismissing Wrights' 
counterclaim. (R. 904-899.) The formal order of dismissal was 
entered December 10, 1996. (R. 912-910.) 
2Judge Eyre's Memorandum Decision dismissing the case (R. 762-
760), as well as Judge Davis's prior decision on standing (R. 647-
645) , had both stated the case would be dismissed without 
prejudice. 
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Plaintiffs obtained a 30-day extension of time to appeal (R. 
920-918), and filed their notice of appeal on February 10, 1997. 
(R. 923-921.) The Supreme Court poured the case over to this Court 
on April 30, 1997. (R. 931.) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
In 1974, QMF, then a corporation3 owned by Wrights and 
Caspers, purchased a parcel of property in Mapleton, Utah, 
containing a little over a hundred acres. (R. 495.) A 25-acre 
portion of that property was preliminarily approved as a planned 
unit development ("PUD") in 1974. Although lots were sold pre-
viously, the formal approval for the PUD occurred in 1980. (R. 
494.) As part of the PUD, approximately two acres were set aside 
as common ground. (R. 506.) 
For financial and other reasons, Wrights and Caspers deter-
mined to amend the PUD documents to reacquire part of the common 
ground, which could then be sold as a new lot. (R. 506.) In order 
to maintain the required 25 acres in the PUD, Wrights would convey 
other property to the PUD. (Id.) George Wright prepared an amended 
plat, Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development Plat "C," to 
accomplish this change. The amended plat "C" had essentially the 
same lots (with some adjustments in lot lines) as the prior plats. 
(R. 168.) 
3QMF, Inc. was involuntarily dissolved on December 1, 1987. (R. 
729 f 4, 735 J[ 4.) 
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Mapleton City required Wrights and Caspers to obtain the 
signatures of all the lot owners to change the plat. (R. 505.) 
George Wright obtained the signatures of all the owners except 
Steve Hechtle, the prior owner of the Triesault lot. Hechtle 
orally authorized Wright to sign the amended plat, but did not give 
a written power of attorney. (R. 444.) Wright represented to the 
homeowners who personally signed the plat, including Bakers, that 
"the funds that came from the sale of [the new lot] would be used 
for the benefit of the PUD." (R. 128.) 
The amended Plat "C" was not recorded until March 16, 1993. 
(R. 530.) Prior to recordation, on March 1, 1993, Hechtle had sold 
his lot to Triesaults. (Id.) Wrights never sought the signature of 
the Triesaults on the amended plat; therefore, neither Hechtle nor 
Triesaults ever signed the amended plat. 
George Wright had facilitated the sale to Triesaults by 
representing to them, among other things, that the common area 
could never be built on, and that the land directly behind the 
subject lot was Forest Service land. (R. 414 (Triesault deposition 
p. 13).) Contrary to these representations, the land directly 
behind the lot purchased by Triesaults was owned by QMF, not Forest 
Service. (R. 313.) Also contrary to these representations, Wright 
was in the process of removing some of the common area to be sold 
as a building lot. 
As part of the plat amendment process, the title company 
requested that all the lot owners sign a quit claim deed conveying 
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all the property back to QMF, so the amended plat would reconvey 
the property to the lot owners. Triesaults were now lot owners, 
although they had not signed the amended plat, so a quit claim deed 
from them was necessary to facilitate the title company's mechanism 
for amending the plat. To obtain Triesaults' signatures, George 
Wright told them the quit claim deed was required to make 
"technical adjustments" to add some unusable hillside land to their 
lot. (R. 410 (Triesault deposition p. 45); R. 106-105.) Wright 
did not disclose that the effect of the deed would be to remove 1.8 
acres from the heart of the prior common area. (R. 4 09 (Triesault 
deposition p. 50).) 
Wright used the 1.8 acres along with additional land he owned 
to create a lot which was sold for $85,000. George Wright received 
approximately $24,000 of that amount. Approximately $10,000 went 
directly to Mr. Casper. Additional amounts were used to pay bills 
owed by Wrights' and Caspers' partnership, Quiet Meadow Farms. The 
monies were not used for the debts of the PUD. (R. 167-166.) 
Plaintiffs brought this action to recover the value of the 
common area which was taken from the PUD and to recover for the 
reduced value of their own properties. (R. 720.) Plaintiffs 
testified that they did not seek to profit from the lawsuit, but 
only to recover what was taken. (R. 477.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs allege they were induced by defendants' wrongful 
acts to personally take actions—Triesaults to buy property and to 
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quit claim that property back to developer, and Bakers to approve 
an amendment to the PUD. These misrepresentations were made 
personally to plaintiffs and induced individual acts by each 
plaintiff. Plaintiffs have standing to assert claims based on 
those acts. 
Plaintiffs also had standing to privately assert claims which 
may have been common with other owners in the PUD. As with a 
condominium, an owner in a PUD has private rights and has standing 
to assert those rights. Standing is not defeated by the fact that 
other PUD residents may have the same rights. 
Plaintiffs did not waive their claims by revealing an advance 
intent to donate any fruits of the litigation to the homeowners 
association. 
The fact that a majority of homeowners expressed, outside of 
any meeting, a willingness to approve the amended PUD plat does not 
obviate compliance with the formal requirements. Votes cannot be 
taken outside of a meeting; the objecting homeowners have a right 
to a formal meeting where their positions can be advocated. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS HAD STANDING TO PURSUE 
THEIR PERSONAL CLAIMS. 
Standing is a jurisdictional issue which considers whether a 
person has a sufficient interest in a controversy to bring a 
lawsuit. The Utah Supreme Court has noted that standing issues 
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often turn on the facts of a case and that generalizations about 
standing to sue are largely worthless as such." Kennecott Corp v. 
Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451, 453 (Utah 1985) (citation omitted, 
quotation marks omitted). The Court has nonetheless developed the 
following test for standing: 
1. We first apply traditional standing 
criteria, which require that (a) the interests 
of the parties be adverse, and (b) the parties 
seeking relief have a legally protectible 
interest in the controversy. Plaintiff must 
be able to show that he has suffered some 
distinct and palpable injury that gives him a 
personal stake in the outcome of the legal 
dispute. 
2. If the plaintiff has no standing 
under the first step, then he may have stand-
ing if no one has a greater interest than he 
and if the issue is unlikely to be raised at 
all if the plaintiff is denied standing. 
3. In unique cases, standing may be 
established by a showing that the issues 
raised by the plaintiff are of great public 
importance and ought to be judicially 
resolved. 
Kennecott, 702 P.2d at 454 (citing Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 
(Utah 1983) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
In this case plaintiffs asserted two separate interests: 
personal claims, and claims on behalf of all homeowners. 
Plaintiffs had standing to assert both claims. 
Plaintiffs' complaint alleges wrongs personal to the 
plaintiffs. Paragraph 14 of the amended complaint alleges that 
George Wright falsely told Jon Triesault that the purpose of 
executing a quit claim deed was to make "technical adjustments" in 
the plat, rather than truthfully stating that its purpose was to 
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eliminate the most valuable part of common area. Paragraph 19 
alleges that Wright falsely told Bakers that the proceeds from the 
sale of the common area would be used for the purpose of improving 
and maintaining the common area. 
Although all homeowners were harmed by the removal of the 
property from the common area, plaintiffs suffered wrongs 
individually, independent from their ownership in the homeowners 
association. These damages are alleged in paragraph 39 of the 
complaint: 
The plaintiffs, and each of them, were injured 
and damaged by the removal of the Common Area 
taken by the Defendants Wrights, Casper and 
QMF. That injury and damages includes, but is 
not necessarily limited to: a) the reduction 
of the Common Area; b) the value of the Common 
Area taken by the Defendants Wright, Casper 
and QMF; c) the likelihood that they would be 
unable to pick cherries from the cherry trees; 
d) the reduced possibility of access; e) the 
reduction in value of their properties as a 
result of the access problems described above; 
f) the reduction in value of their property as 
a result of the property to the east of Quiet 
Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development being 
owned by private property owners (including 
the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF) rather 
than the National Forest Service; g) other 
damages as may be proven at trial. 
(R. 720.) 
The harm to all of the plaintiffs is real, substantial, and 
personal. These are not rights which plaintiffs are attempting to 
assert for the benefit of the homeowners association, but rather 
rights which are individual and personal to the plaintiffs. 
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Plaintiffs, and only plaintiffs, have standing to pursue these 
claims. 
Plaintiffs also had rights common with all members of the 
homeowners association. Because of the unique nature of a PUD 
(similar to a condominium), both an individual owner and the 
homeowners association could have standing to assert similar 
rights. The document creating the PUD did so by reference to the 
Utah Condominium Act, and the property rights created are 
functionally the same as for condominiums. The Utah Supreme Court 
described those rights as follows: 
A condominium owner is the holder of a 
hybrid real property interest consisting of 
"two distinct tenures, one in severalty and 
the other in common; both types, although well 
established separately, are inseparably joined 
in a condominium." 
Brickyard Homeowners' Ass/n Management Comm. v. Gibbons Realty Co. , 
668 P.2d 535, 537 (Utah 1983). Based on the same analysis, the 
court in Rogers & Ford Const. Corp. v. Carlandia Corp., 626 So. 2d 
1350 (Fla. 1993), held that an individual unit owner has standing 
to sue for defects in the common areas of a condominium, so long as 
the interests of the other unit owners are protected. 
Plaintiffs had an individual interest in the common areas. 
Plaintiffs joined the other homeowners, which would have protected 
their interests. The district court erred in holding that 
plaintiffs lacked standing. 
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POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS DID NOT WAIVE THEIR CLAIMS. 
The trial court was concerned that the plaintiffs "do not 
request monetary gain as an outcome of the lawsuit." (R. 901.) 
This "finding" is not supported by the deposition testimony. Mr. 
Triesault testified: 
Q. Mr. Triesault, do you claim that you 
and your wife are entitled to the full value 
of the common areas that were taken out? 
A. No. 
Q. What would be your claim? 
A. A portion. There is no claim on my 
behalf for a monetary gain of any kind. This 
is a claim to return the common ground, and 
any damages that may have been incurred or 
legal expenses, or whatever else is pled in 
the complaint. There is no attempt on my part 
or I believe on Mr. Baker's part to profit in 
any way by this lawsuit, financially. 
Q. You're not seeking to benefit 
monetarily at all from the lawsuit? 
A. Not personally. If there are 
benefits monetarily, they would be given to 
the homeowners' association. 
R. 477 (italics added). 
Plaintiffs clearly prayed for compensatory damages, for 
punitive damages, for attorney fees, for declaratory relief, and 
for other relief as appropriate. The complaint stated a cognizable 
claim for that relief. It is irrelevant what plaintiffs may have 
chosen to do with any money awarded. The fact that plaintiffs may 
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have chosen to donate any money back to the association does not 
constitute a waiver of the right to receive that money. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS SUFFERED A LEGAL INJURY EVEN THOUGH 
A MAJORITY OF THE HOMEOWNERS DISAGREED 
WITH PLAINTIFFS' POSITION. 
The trial court stated: "The Court has difficulty in finding 
an injury where the common ground has been disposed of in 
compliance with the applicable statute, and where additional 
property has been deeded back to compensate for that disposal." 
(R. 901.) The claim that the property had been disposed of in 
compliance with statute was based on the court's interpretation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-32 (1996), which permits sale of condominium 
property upon the affirmative vote of at least three-fourths of the 
unit owners. The trial court reasoned that, "[a]lthough no 
official vote was taken," because eight of the ten owners in this 
case consented to the sale of the common area, those "votes" would 
"effectively bind all property owners, including the Plaintiffs." 
(R. 901.) 
The error in this reasoning is its assumption that a vote can 
be taken without a meeting. The Utah Supreme Court long ago 
rejected that concept in the context of a corporation: 
A corporation being but an artificial entity, 
has but one will, and this will is collected 
by the sense of a majority of the directors. 
Its will, so collected, directs and controls 
the corporate acts. It is therefore important 
that every director should have an opportunity 
to be heard on all matters affecting the 
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corporation, so that, through the sense of 
all, its best interests may be subserved. 
Every director is entitled to the reasoning, 
judgment, and advice of every other director 
. . . . [W]here matters to be acted upon call 
for deliberation and judgment, all interests 
and parties to be affected should have the 
benefit of the wisdom and counsel of all those 
intrusted with the decision. Although all may 
not concur, still the arguments and 
information of each may modify and affect the 
conclusions which otherwise might be reached. 
Singer v. Salt Lake City Copper Mfg. Co., 17 Utah 143, 53 P. 1024, 
1028 (1898). 
The fact that eight of ten owners approved the sale is 
therefore of no relevance. This Court must presume that some of 
eight may have been persuaded by the arguments of the two had a 
formal meeting occurred. There was no lawful, proper vote in this 
case. The lack of that vote was not harmless. 
An additional error in the trial court's reasoning is found 
in the comment that "additional property has been deeded back to 
compensate" for the loss of part of the common area. Land is 
unique. Redevelopment Agency v. Mitsui Investment, Inc., 522 P.2d 
1370, 1373 (Utah 1974). Plaintiffs characterized the lost property 
as the heart of the common area. Although equal acreage was deeded 
back to replace the lost property, it certainly was not of equal 
value. The original common area was a generally flat lot planted 
with cherry trees, a place where children could play. The 
replacement property was steep hillside. If the properties were in 
fact equivalent, Wrights and Caspers would have had no motivation 
to carve out the common area in the first place. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs had standing, both for private wrongs and for 
wrongs to all homeowners in the PUD. Plaintiffs did not waive 
their claims. The dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint should be 
reversed. 
DATED this 7 ^ day of July, 1997. 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: y^f 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN-/ 
Attorneys for Appellants 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
7 ^ was mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 
July, 1997. 
Richard D. Bradford, Esq. 
Bradford, Brady & Rasmussen 
389 North University Avenue 
P. 0. Box 432 
Provo, UT 84603 
Thomas W. Seiler, Esq. 
Robinson, Seiler & Glazier 
80 North 100 East 
P. O. Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603 
M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq. 
Jeffs & Jeffs 
90 North 100 East 
P. 0. Box 888 
Provo, UT 84603 
day of 
J:\LWS\TRIESAUL.B 
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APPENDIX "A" 
Amended Complaint (R. 730-696) 
I L>. w J 
Thomas W. Seiler, #2910 
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
80 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603-1266 
Telephone: (801) 375-1920 
a 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JON TRIESAULT, ELIZABETH 
TRIESAULT, ROGER CLIVE BAKER, 
and LYNNETTE JENNIFER BAKER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
QMF, INC., WILLIAM E. CASPER, 
JR., SHIRLEY A. CASPER, 
GEORGE G. WRIGHT, JANE C. 
WRIGHT, STANLEY WAYNE CURTIS, 
WILLIAM G. SCHWARTZ, MICHAEL 
G. RIEKER, CAROL P. RIEKER, 
MARILYN S. PETERSON, Trustee, 
and GARY B. PETERSON, Trustee, 
of the PETERSON FAMILY TRUST 
dated 1/26/89, PATRICIA H. 
CLARK, Trustee of the J.D. 
AND PATRICIA H. CLARK FAMILY 
LIVING TRUST, and QUIET 
MEADOW FARMS OWNERS 
ASSOCIATION (defined in Quiet 
Meadow Farms Planned Unit 
Development Agreement), and 
RICHARD G. THORPE, and JAN 
THORPE, and JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 950400154 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs, by and through their 
counsel of record, Thomas W. Seiler of Robinson, Seiler & 
Glazier, LC, and allege as follows: 
FACTS 
1. The Plaintiffs Jon Triesault and Elizabeth 
Triesault are residents of Utah County, State of Utah, and 
purchased all of Lot 4, Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit 
Development, amended Plat "A", Mapleton, Utah, according to 
the official Plat thereof on file in the Office of the 
Recorder, Utah County, State of Utah, from Stephen E. Hechtle, 
pursuant to that certain Warranty Deed recorded March 1, 1993, 
as Entry No. 11594, in Book 3 095, at Page 10, of the Utah 
County Recorders Office, a copy of which is attached hereto 
and made a part hereof by reference as Exhibit "A" . 
2. The Defendants William E. Casper and Shirley A. 
Casper, sometimes hereinafter collectively referred to as 
Casper, are residents of the State of California. 
3. The Defendants George G. Wright and Jane C. 
Wright, sometimes hereinafter collectively referred to as 
Wright, are residents of Utah County, State of Utah. 
4. QMF, Inc., sometimes hereinafter referred to as 
QMF, is an association and not a corporation recognized by the 
State of Utah, having been involuntarily dissolved on December 
1, 1987. 
2 
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5. QMF, Inc., is owned and controlled by Casper 
and Wright. 
6. No filing has been made with the Department of 
Business Regulations of the State of Utah to reinstate QMF, 
Inc., since its involuntarily dissolution on December 1, 1987. 
7. The Remaining Individual Defendants (referred 
to herein as such) are property owners owning property in 
Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development, and are members 
of the Defendant Owners Association. 
8. The Defendant Owners Association is an 
association created by the Defendants Wright, Casper, and QMF 
to govern Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development. 
9. The Plaintiffs Roger Clive Baker and Lynnette 
Jennifer Baker, sometimes hereinafter collectively referred to 
as Baker, are residents of Utah County, State of Utah, and are 
owners of a home and a lot located in Quiet Meadow Farms 
Planned Unit Development. 
10. The Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF are the 
developers of Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development, 
Plats "A", "B" and "C", are the developers of the G. Wright 
"A" Subdivision which has been created from the Common Area of 
Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development. 
11. Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development, 
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Plat "C", contains generally the same lots (with some 
adjustments in the lot lines) as do Quiet Meadow Farms Planned 
Unit Development, Plats "A" and Amended Plat "B". 
12. The Defendants Wright, Casper, and QMF, have 
caused approximately 1.8 acres of the Common Area described in 
Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development, Plat "A", and 
Amended Plat "B" to be removed from the Common Area to help 
create the G. Wright "A" Subdivision. 
13. Attached hereto and made a part hereof by 
reference as Exhibit "B" is a Quit Claim Deed recorded with 
the Office of the Utah County Recorder, Utah County, State of 
Utah, as Entry No. 15043, in Book 3103, beginning at Page 574 
(hereinafter referred to as the Fraudulent Quit Claim Deed) . 
14. Between the acquisition of Lot 4 as described 
on Exhibit "A" and the execution of the Fraudulent Quit Claim 
Deed, the Defendants Wright, Casper, and QMF, acting through 
the Defendant George Wright, represented to the Plaintiff 
Triesault that the purpose for executing the Fraudulent Quit 
Claim Deed (Exhibit "B") was to make "technical adjustments" 
to the Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development Plat. 
15. The representations referred to in Paragraph 14 
above were made on or about the date of execution of the 
Fraudulent Quit Claim Deed (Exhibit "B"). 
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16. The Defendants Wright, Casper, and QMF had 
known for not less than four months prior to the 
representation described in Paragraph 14 being made, that the 
Defendants Wright, Casper, and QMF intended to cause the Quiet 
Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development Plats "A" and "B" 
(Amended) to be vacated. 
17. On or about November 12, 1992, the Defendants 
Wright, Casper, and QMF represented to Mapleton City, State of 
Utah, that all the owners of property located in Quiet Meadow 
Farms Planned Unit Development Amended Plat "A" and Amended 
Plat "B" had executed Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit 
Development Plat "C". 
18. On November 12, 1992, the Defendants Wright, 
Casper and QMF well knew that all of the owners of property in 
Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development Amended Plat "A" 
and Amended Plat "B" had not executed Quiet Meadow Farms 
Planned Unit Development Plat "C" and that such 
representation, as made by the Defendants Wright, Casper and 
QMF, and each of them, was fraudulent. 
19. The Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF, acting 
through the Defendant George Wright, represented to the 
Plaintiffs Baker that: a) a portion of the Common Area of 
Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development Amended Plat "A" 
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and Amended Plat "B" would be removed; b) that additional 
property would be added to Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit 
Development in the new Plat "C" to increase the acreage to not 
less than 25 acres; and c) that the proceeds from the sale of 
the Common Area now included in the G. Wright "A" Subdivision 
(hereinafter referred to as the Common Area taken by the 
Defendants Wright, Casper, and QMF) would be used for the 
purpose of improving and maintaining the Common Area of Quiet 
Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development. 
20. Prior to the purchase of their respective lots, 
the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF represented to the 
Plaintiffs that there was access in and-to Quiet Meadow Farms 
Planned Unit Development (regardless of the Plat) from 
Mapleton Road, Mapleton City, State of Utah. 
21. In fact, the access which appears on the ground 
goes across property owned by the adjoining property owner to 
the south, and, upon information and belief, these Plaintiffs 
allege that, prior to the initiation of this lawsuit, there 
was no written document providing for continued access to 
Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development across the 
southern property owner's ground. 
22. The Common Area taken by the Defendants Wright, 
Casper and QMF would have allowed Quiet Meadow Farms Planned 
6 
Unit Development additional access to Mapleton Road. 
23. The Common Area taken by the Defendants Wright, 
Casper and QMF is planted, at least in part, with cherry 
trees. 
24. Immediately prior to the purchase of their lot, 
the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF (through the Defendant 
George Wright) represented to the Plaintiffs Triesault that 
the Plaintiffs Triesault would be entitled to pick cherries in 
perpetuity from the cherry trees, which exist on the Common 
Area taken by the Defendants. 
25. After the commencement of this lawsuit, the 
Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF sold the Common Area taken 
by the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF to third parties (Mr. 
and Mrs. Croshaw). 
26. Upon information and belief, the Common Area 
taken by the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF is alleged to 
be valued at between $61,200 and $85,000. The actual value is 
susceptible to proof before the Court. 
27. At the time the Plaintiffs Triesault purchased 
their lot pursuant to Exhibit "A", the Defendants Wright, 
Casper and QMF represented to the Plaintiffs Triesault that 
the property immediately to the east of Quiet Meadow Farms 
Planned Unit Development was owned by the National Forest 
7 
-SCO 724 
Service. In fact, the property adjoining to the east is not 
owned by the National Forest Service, but is owned by private 
property owners, including the Defendants Wright, Casper and 
QMF. 
28. The Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF have 
maintained two metal buildings in the southwesterly portion of 
the Common Areas, which they have used for their exclusive use 
to the detriment of these Plaintiffs in an amount to be proven 
at trial. 
29. The Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF have 
admitted that the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF should 
have disclosed to the Plaintiffs Triesault their intention to 
remove the Common Area taken by the Defendants Wright, Casper 
and QMF from Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development prior 
to convincing the Plaintiffs Triesault to execute the 
Fraudulent Quit Claim Deed. 
30. The Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF have made 
fraudulent misrepresentations to the Plaintiffs as set forth 
above, including, but not necessarily limited to: 
a. The request that the Fraudulent Quit Claim 
Deed be signed so that the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF 
could make technical adjustments to the Quiet Meadow Farms 
Planned Unit Development property lines; 
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b. That the Plaintiffs Triesault could pick 
cherries on the Common Area taken by the Defendants Wright, 
Casper and QMF in perpetuity; 
c. That the property to the east of Quiet 
Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development was owned by the 
National Forest Service; 
d. That the access to Quiet Meadow Farms 
Planned Unit Development to Mapleton Road was secure; 
e. That the proceeds from the sale of the 
Common Area taken by the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF 
would go to improve and maintain Quiet Meadow Farms Planned 
Unit Development Common Area; and other representations set 
forth above; all of which are referred to hereinafter as the 
Fraudulent Misrepresentations, and were known by the 
Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF to be false at the time they 
were made. 
31. Each of the Fraudulent Misrepresentations made 
by the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF were representations 
concerning presently existing material facts. 
3 2 . The Fraudulent Misrepresentations were known by 
the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF to be false, or were 
made by the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF knowing that the 
Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF had insufficient knowledge 
9 
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upon which to base such representations. 
33. The Fraudulent Misrepresentations were made by 
the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF for the purpose of 
inducing the Plaintiffs to act upon them. 
34. The Plaintiffs Triesault acted upon the 
Fraudulent Misrepresentations by executing the Fraudulent Quit 
Claim Deed, Exhibit "B". 
35. The Plaintiffs Baker acted upon the Fraudulent 
Misrepresentations of the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF by 
executing Plat "C" of Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit 
Development and executing the Fraudulent Quit Claim Deed 
(Exhibit «B"). 
36. The Plaintiffs, and each of them, acted 
reasonably and in ignorance of the falsity of the Fraudulent 
Misrepresentations. 
37. The Plaintiffs, and each of them, did in fact 
rely upon the Fraudulent Misrepresentations in executing the 
Fraudulent Quit Claim Deed (Exhibit "B") and, as to the 
Plaintiffs Baker, in executing Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit 
Development Plat "C". 
38. The Plaintiffs, and each of them, were induced 
to execute the documents referred to in the preceding 
paragraphs as a result of the Fraudulent Misrepresentations of 
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Defendants Wright, Casper, and QMF. 
39. The Plaintiffs, and each of them, were injured 
and damaged by the removal of the Common Area taken by the 
Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF. That injury and damage 
includes, but is not necessarily limited to: a) the reduction 
of the Common Area; b) the value of the Common Area taken by 
the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF; c) the likelihood that 
they would be unable to pick cherries from the cherry trees; 
d) the reduced possibility of access; e) the reduction in 
value of their properties as a result of the access problems 
described above; f) the reduction in value of their property 
as a result of the property to the east of Quiet Meadow Farms 
Planned Unit Development being owned by private property 
owners (including the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF) 
rather than the National Forest Service; g) other damages as 
may be proven at trial. 
40. As part of the scheme and artifice to mislead 
the Plaintiffs, the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF (through 
the Defendant George Wright) represented to Mapleton City on 
or about November 12, 1992, that all of the owners of the 
property described as Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit 
Development Plat "C" had executed said Plat, when in fact at 
least Stephen E. Hechtle, who1 was an owner of property 
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contained thereon, had not signed the said Plat. 
41. Such misrepresentation was necessary in order 
to present said Plat to the Planning Commission of Mapleton 
City for Planning Commission approval, which Planning 
Commission approval appears to have been obtained on or about 
November 12, 1992. 
42. It was necessary for the Defendants Wright, 
Casper, and QMF to make fraudulent misrepresentations to the 
Plaintiffs to induce the Plaintiffs to execute the Fraudulent 
Quit Claim Deed in order to obtain approval from the City 
Council of Mapleton City for the vacation of Plat "A" Amended 
and Plat "B", Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development, 
which Plat Vacation Notice was executed by Ernest "Skip" 
Predmore on or about March 11, 1993, the date of execution of 
the Fraudulent Quit Claim Deed. 
43. In addition to the Plaintiffs, the Defendants 
Stanley Wayne Curtis, William G. Schwartz, Michael G. Rieker, 
Carol P. Rieker, Marilyn S. Peterson, Gary B. Peterson, and 
Patricia H. Clark executed the Fraudulent Quit Claim Deed. 
Upon information and belief, the Plaintiffs allege that the 
one or more of the Fraudulent Misrepresentations made by the 
Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF (through the Defendant 
George Wright) were made to the remaining individual 
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Defendants. This allegation is based, in part, upon the 
testimony of George Wright to the effect that the Defendant 
George Wright told everyone he talked to that the funds that 
came from the sale of Lot 1, the G. Wright Subdivision, Plat 
"A", would be used for the benefit of the Quiet Meadow Farms 
Planned Unit Development. 
44. Upon information and belief, the Plaintiffs 
allege that some of the parties executing the Fraudulent Quit 
Claim Deed did not personally appear before the notary public 
to execute the Fraudulent Quit Claim Deed. The Defendants 
Wright, Casper and QMF knew that one or more of the signators 
on the Fraudulent Quit Claim Deed had not personally appeared 
before the notary to sign the Fraudulent Quit Claim Deed, nor 
to acknowledge that they had executed the same. This 
allegation is based, in part, on the testimony of the 
Defendant George Wright to the effect that the Defendants 
Rieker, the Plaintiffs Baker, the Defendants Clark, the 
Defendants Peterson, the Defendants Curtis, the Defendants 
Schwartz, and the Defendants Wright each signed the Quiet 
Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development Plat "C", which 
signatures were not affixed in front of a notary, contrary to 
the representation contained on Quiet Meadow Farms Planned 
Unit Development Plat "C". 
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45. The Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive damages 
against the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF in the amount of 
the value of the Common Area taken by the Defendants Wright, 
Casper and QMF, which value is $250,000 or more as is proven 
at trial. 
46. The Plaintiffs are entitled to recover all 
costs incurred herein and, including, but not limited to, 
reasonable attorney's fees, which reasonable attorney's fees 
are in the amount of $4 0,000 or more as is proven at trial. 
47. The Defendants Stanley Wayne Curtis, William G. 
Schwartz, Michael G. Rieker, Carol P. Rieker, Marilyn S. 
Peterson, Gary B. Peterson, Patricia H. Clark, Richard G. 
Thorpe and Jan Thorpe, hereinafter Remaining Individual 
Defendants, claim an interest in and to portions of the real 
property described in this Complaint, and are members of the 
Defendant Owners Association. 
48. The Defendant Owners Association is an 
association established by the Defendants Wright, Casper and 
QMF, of which the Plaintiffs and all individual Defendants are 
members, which was established for the purposes set forth in 
the Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development Agreement, 
attached as Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein by reference. 
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49. Pursuant to Exhibit "C", the Quiet Meadow Farms 
Planned Unit Development was created pursuant to the Mapleton 
City Zoning Ordinance and the Utah Condominium Ownership Act, 
each of which are incorporated herein by reference. 
50. Upon information and belief, the Plaintiffs 
allege that the provisions of the second sentence of paragraph 
1 of Exhibit "C" have not been enforced as property has 
changed hands in Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development. 
51. The business of the Defendant Owners 
Association, including the operation, maintenance and 
improvement of the Common Areas of the Quiet Meadow Farms 
Planned Unit Development shall be conducted by an Executive 
Committee consisting of three members to be elected by the 
owners. 
52. In fact, the Executive Committee has been made 
up of the various homeowners who are named as parties in this 
action. 
53. The Executive Committee has chosen not to 
pursue the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF for the damages 
alleged in this Complaint, and, accordingly, the Remaining 
Individual Defendants and the Defendant Owners Association 
have been named to place all parties before the Court. 
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54 . The Plaintiffs are entitled to an Order of the 
Court determining that the Owners Association and the 
Remaining Individual Defendants have failed and refused to 
pursue the claim for damages set forth herein, and, pursuant 
to the Court's Ruling of January 24, 1996, they are 
indispensable parties who must be brought into the action. 
55. The Plaintiffs are entitled to an Order of the 
Court determining the interests of all parties who are members 
of the Owners Association as to the judgment which will be 
awarded upon the successful completion of this action. 
56. The Plaintiffs are furthermore entitled to an 
Order of the Court determining the rights of all parties in 
and to the funds, the access, the metal building, and the 
punitive damages described throughout this complaint. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray for judgment as 
follows: 
1. For an amount to be proven at trial 
representing the reasonable value of the Common Area taken by 
the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF. 
2. For punitive damages in the amount of $250,000. 
3. For an Order of the Court determining the 
reduction in value of the Plaintiffs' property as a result of 
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the Fraudulent Misrepresentations made by the Defendants 
Wright, Casper and QMF, including, but not limited to: a) the 
reduction of the Common Area; b) the value of the Common Area 
taken by the Defendants Wright, Casper and QMF; c) the 
likelihood that they would be unable to pick cherries from the 
cherry trees; d) the reduced possibility of access; e) the 
reduction in value of their properties as a result of the 
access problems described above; f) the reduction in value of 
their property as a result of the property to the east of 
Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development being owned by 
private property owners (including the Defendants Wright, 
Casper and QMF) rather than the National Forest Service; g) 
other damages as may be proven at trial. 
4. For all costs incurred herein and including, 
but not limited to, reasonable attorney's fees, which 
reasonable attorney's fees shall be in the amount of $40,000 
or more as is proven at trial. 
5. For determination by the Court as to the 
interests of the Remaining Individual Defendants and the 
Defendant Owners Association in and to the damages awarded 
hereby. 
6. For such other and further relief as to the 
17 
Court may seem just and proper under the circumstances. 
DATED this ^ 7 day of February, 1996. 
ROBINSDN, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC 
Thomas W. Seiler 
Plaintiffs' Addresses: 
Jon and Elizabeth Triesault 
18 Quiet Meadow Lane 
Mapleton, UT 84664 
Roger & Lynnette Baker 
23 Quiet Meadow Lane 
Mapleton, UT 84664 
G:\SEILER\TRIESAULCOM 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that correct copies of the 
foregoing were mailed, postage prepaid, this £ 3 day of 
February, 1996, addressed as follows: 
Richard D. Bradford 
BRADFORD, BRADY & RASMUSSEN, PC 
389 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 432 
Provo, UT 84603 
M. Dayle Jeffs 
Jeffs & Jeffs 
90 North 100 East 
Provo, UT 84 603 
Ji: s jQt.op 
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Recorded at Request of_ 
nL _. M. Fee Paid $_ 
by-
Mail tax notice to_ 
(Ml! 
EHT 1 1 5 9 4 BK 30<??5 PG JU 
MIMA g RSID UTAH CO RECORDER BY MB 
1993 MAR 1 9 U 5 All FEE 8,00 1 
RECORDED FOR SECURITY TTTI F AMD AHpACT 
Dep. Book_ 
_ Address,. 
Page- Ref.: 
WARRANTY DEED 
STEPHEN E. UECIITLE aka STEVEN E. IIECHTLE * 
of San Jose , County otyJ^^^ UUc*4
 f S t a t e 0 j c A f r 
grantors 
i j* **- <^w^c^ ^
 g t a t e oj[ C A ? ^ hereby 
CONVEY and WARRANT to
 J ( ) N TRIESAULT and ELIZABETH TRIESAULT, husband and 
w i f e , as Jo in t Tenants , with f u l l r igh t of s u r v i v o r s h i p 
grantee 
for the sum of 
- DOLLARS, 
o f 2136 Spring Oaks D r . , S p r l n g v l l l e , Utah 84663 
$10 .00 and other good and v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
the following described tract of land in Utah County, 
State of Utah: 
Lot A, Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development, Amended P l a t "A", 
Mapleton, Utah, according to the o f f i c i a l p l a t thereof on f i l e in the 
o f f i c e of the REcorder, Utah County, Utah. 
Subject to Easements and Covenants of record. 
4>v? *%$K 
WITNESS, the hands of said grantois , this 25th 
February , A. D. 19 93 
* . • • 
day of 
O i , 
£//esM /tt/J^£/LM=\ 
My commission expffes. 
BLAMK #»Ot — WAnriANrr Dcei>—<D G E M P R I N T I N G G O . — SALT LAKE 
•000 710 
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CALIFORNIA ALL-PURPOSE ACKNOWLEDGMENT NO 5193 
fcpssssasssssssssssssssssssssssassssssssss^ 
.£^<G t ^ w ^ 
County of_ &evjv< ClaVzv } 
I 
fU*v^ry<3r, 1^13 
On before me,. 
personally appeared ^ t b ^ * * - * * b 
»<y ftuJr(?/C 
. 'JANE fX)E. WOTARY PUBLIC* NAME. TITLE OfcOFFICER t .G 
• personally known to me - OR -
NAME(S) OF SIGNER(S) 
Tj3^>roved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence 
f to be the person^) whose name(s/) ls/ate-1 
subscribed to the within instrument and ac-
knowledged to me that he/ahe/they executed 
the same in his/her/their authorized 
capacityfrest, and that by his/her/their 
signature^ on the instrument the person^, 
per6on(6) acted, executed the instrument. 
OFFICtAL SEM, 
A K NIGAM 
NOTARY PUBLIC - CALIFORNIA 
SANTA CIARA COUNTY 
My comm. expires MAR 27, 1993 
WITNESS my hand and official seal. 
SNATURETJPWGTAR SIG   R E I ^ R Y 
OPTIONAL SECTION 
1 OPTIONAL SECTION 1 
CAPACITY CLAIMED BY SIGNER 
Though statute does not require the Notary to 
fill In the data below, doing so may prove 
Invaluable to persons relying on the document. 
nJ^NDIVIDUAL 
• CORPORATE OFFICER(S) 
TITIE(S) 
• PARTNER(S) • LIMITED 
j~2 GENERAL 
• ATTORNEY-IN-FACT 
• TRUSTEE(S) 
Q GUARDIAN/CONSERVATOR 
• OTHER: 
SIGNER IS REPRESENTING: 
NAME OF PERSON(S) OR ENTITY(IES) 
THIS CERTIFICATE MUST BE ATTACHED TO 
THE DOCUMENT DESCRIBED AT RIGHT: 
Though the data requested here is not required by law. 
it could prevent Iraudulent rentlachment of this form. 
TITLE OR TYPE OF DOCUMENT. 
NUMBER OF PAGES I 
[NaYrttxdy J^IL^X 
DATE OF DOCUMENT. 
SIGNER(S) OTHER THAN NAMED ABOVE _ iVffw^, 
f^h a?3T,
 m 3 
©1992 NATIONAL NOTARY ASSOCIATION • 8236 Remmet Ave . P.O. Box 7184 • Canoga Park. CA 91309 7184 
• ^ - 709 
ENT I S O * 3K 3 1 0 3 PS 5 / * 
NINA 8 REID UTAH CO SECORDK BY n& 
1993 flAR 16 9:54 Art til 18.50
 A O r . r ^ . . T 
RECORDED FOR SECURITY TITLE AHO AeST*»*.T 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
STANLEY WAYNE CURTIS, WILLIAM G. SCHWARTZ, JON TRIESAULT a n d 
ELIZABETH TRIESAULT, h i s w i f e , GEORGE G. WRIGHT a n d JANE C . WRIGHT, 
h i s w i f e , MICHAEL G. RIEKER and CAROL P . RIEKER, h i s w i f e , ROGER 
CLIVE BAKER a n d LYNNETTE JENNIFER BAKER, h i s w i f e , MARILYN S . 
PETERSON, T r u s t e e a n d GARY B . PETERSON, T r u s t e e o f t h e PETERSON 
FAMILY TRUST, d a t e d 1 / 2 6 / 8 9 , and PATRICIA H. CLARK, T r u s t e e of t h e 
J . D . a n d P a t r i c i a H. C l a r k F a m i l y L i v i n g T r u s t 
g r a n t e e s 
of Mapleton , County of 
QUIT-CLAIM to QMF, INC. 
Utah , State of Utah, hereby 
of 21 Quiet Meadow Lane, Mapleton, Utah 84664 grantee 
for the sum of One Dollar and no/lOOs 
the following described tract of-land in Utah County, 
State of Utah: 
Amended Plat "A", Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development 
and Plat "B" , Amended Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development, 
according to the official plats thereof on file in the office of 
the Recorder, Utah County, Utah. 
Witness the hands of the grantors, this llth day of March 
1993 , A.O,—on thousand nine hundred and ninety three. 
G&L\ ly<C\h&.^. Life 
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T r u s t e e 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) S S 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
On t h e l l ch d a y o f March , 19 93 , p e r s o n a l l y a p p e a r e d 
b e f o r e me MARILYN s . PETERSON and GARY 3 . PETERSON T r u s t e e * u n d e r t h e 
PETERSON FAMILY T r u s t d a t e d t h e 26ch day o f 
January , 19 29 , t h e s i g n e r o f t h e w i t h i n i n s t r u m e n t , who 
d u l y a c k n o w l e d g e d t o me t h a t t h e y e x e c u t e d t h e same p u r s u a n t t o 
and i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e powers v e s t e d i n them by t h e t e r n s of 
s a i d T r u s t A g r e e m e n t . 
My C o m m i s s i o n E x p i r e s : 7/1/96 
N o t a r y P u b i i c 
R e s i d i n g a t : Provo, Utah 
Mon Mar 06 1995 17:19 UTAH COUNTY RECORDERS OFFICE 70 
S T A T E OF 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
) S S 
) 
On the 11th day of March #199 3 , p e r s o n a l l y 
appeared before we MICHAEL G. RIEKER and CAROL P. RIEKER, his wife , a 
s i g n e r s of the f o r e g o i n g instrument, who duly acknowledged t o me 
that t h e Y executed the same. 
Hy Commission Expires: 
7/1/96 
• ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Notary Publ ic 
Residing in Provo 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS 
March 1 9 9 
COUNTY OF ^AH ) 
On t h e 11th d a y 0 f 
a p p e a r e d b e f o r e me ROGER CLIVE BAKER and LYNNETTE JENNIFER BAKER, h i s w 
s i g n e r s o f the forego ing instrument, who duly acknowledged t o me 
that the y executed the same 
p e r s o n a l l y 
wife" 
^ g ^ A A J ^ = ^ -
Notary Publ ic 
Res id ing in Provo 
e s : 
7/1/96 
Mon Mar 06 1995 17:28 UTAH COUNTY RECORDERS OFFICE 
STATE GF ITt^ 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
y 
) ss 
) 
On the lich day of March ,199 3 , personally 
appeared before me STANLEY WAYNE CURTIS , a 
signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me 
that he. executed the same. 
WESTON GAflHETT 
Provo. UQft W10S 
My Commission Expires: M - 9 6 
SUi ui vun 3j 
My Commiss ion E x p i r e s : 
N o t a r y P u b l i c 
R e s i d i n g i n Provo 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) s s 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
On t h e 11th day o f March
 / 199 3 , personally 
appeared before me WILLIAM G. SCHWARTZ , a 
signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me 
that he executed the same. 
WESTouavwm $ 
ttbsCavr B 
»Canmta»n£^witM-58 91 
SaxtfUofl Jfl 
,*£=£*&£ 
Notary Public 
Residing in Provo 
7/1/96 
Mon Mar 06 1995 17:29 UTAH COUNTY RECORDERS* b^FtCE ^ 
T r u s t e e 
STATE OF 
COUNTY OF OTAH 
UTAH j 
) ss 
) 
On the 
before me 
U t h
 day of Harch 
PATRICIA H. CLASK 
, 19^3
 t personally appeared 
, Trustee under the 
J.D. and PATRICIA !!. CLARX FAMILY JIVING T r u s t dated the day of 
, 19 , the signer of the within instrument, who 
duly acknowledged to me that they executad the same pursuant to 
ind in accordanca with the powers vested in them by the terms of 
said Trust Agreement. 
WE5T0NGAAR£rT 
S5EJ3C5TW 
rroro.iw> &*eo3 ^ 
&fr Conmtawn £xpva: M-98 
assssssssssssssssssssss 
£j^C*n^ «=s**g3.. pjL.fCCKZ 
My Commission E x p i r e s : 7A/96 
Notary P u b l i c 
Res id ing a t : Provo, Utah 
Mon M a r 0 6 1 9 9 5 1 7 : 2 9 UTAH COUNTY RECORDERS O F f T C E 
• J o 
COUNTY OF UTAK 
) ss 
) 
On t h e l l t h day o f March , 1 9 9 ] , p e r s o n a l l y 
appeared before me J 0 N TRIESAULT and ELIZABETH TRIESAULT, his wife
 f a 
s i g n e r 8 o f t h e f o r e g o i n g i n s t r u m e n t , who d u l y a c k n o w l e d g e d t o me 
t h a t c h e 7 e x e c u t e d t h e same. 
Notary P u b l i c 
R e s i d i n g i n Provo 
7/1/96 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
) 
) S S 
On t h e l l c h day o f M a r c h , 1993 , p e r s o n a l l y 
appeared b e f o r e me GEORGE G. WRIGHT and JANE C. WRIGHT, his wife
 ( a 
s i g n e r ^ o f t h e f o r e g o i n g i n s t r u m e n t , who d u l y a c k n o w l e d g e d t o me 
t h a t they e x e c u t e d t h e same. 
'A^£ 
Notary Public 
Residing in_ 
3=32^ nxxxr 
Provo 
i r e s : 
7/1/96 
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QUIET MEADOW FARMS 
PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT 
AGREEMENT 
W-
ft 
The undersigned, who are all the owners of the real property described in Exhibit 
A to thii Agreement have agreed to create a planned unit development within the meaning 
of Maphton City Zoning Ordinance and the Utah Condominium Ownership Act. A set 
of plans for the planned unit development, to be known as Quiet Meadow Farms 
(hereinafter called the "Development"), is attached as Exhibit B to this Agreement. The 
owners have agreed to maintain and manage the common areas of the Development 
according to the terms of this Agreement as set forth below; 
1. Organization and Membership, 
The owners hereby organize themselves as the Quiet Meadow Farms Owners 
Association (hereinafter called the "Association"), an unincorporated association. All 
owners of property in the Development shall be members of the Association, and no 
member may sell or transfer his property unless the new owner agrees in writing to become 
a member of the Association. 
2. Executive Committee. 
The business of the Association, including the operation, maintenance and 
improvement of the common areas of the Development shall be conducted by an executive 
committee consisting of three members to be elected by the owners. 
3. Annual Meetings of the Association. 
Meetings of the members of the Association shall be held at least once 
per year on the first Monday in May, or such other convenient time as three-fourths 
of the owners may agree upon. At the annual meeting the members shall receive a report 
of the business of the Association and elect the executive committee of the Association. 
Each owner shall have three votes and may cast one or more of such votes for any 
candidate. 
4. Covenants to Run with the Land. 
This Agreement shall be recorded as a deed covenant and all covenants, 
restrictions, limitations, and conditions provided in this Agreement shall run with the land 
owned in common by the owners and shall be binding on the owners whose signatures 
appear on this document, ail additional owners who acquire an interest in the common 
areas of the Development, and their successors in interest. 
i 
f\ 
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5. Change of Ownership. 
The executive committee shall require any new owner to furnish evidence 
of ownership and sign a written agreement agreeing to be bound by this Agreement before 
recognizing a new owner's claim to use of the common areas. No interest in the common 
areas may be transferred without the transfer of ownership of a homesite in the 
Development. 
6. Insurance. 
The executive committee shall maintain insurance in an amount equal to 
estimated replacement cost of common facilities. 
7. Assessments. 
Each owner shall pay his proportionate share of common expenses. 
Payment shall be made at such times and in such amounts as the executive committee 
shall determine in accordance with this Agreement and the by-laws of the Association. 
The Association shall have a lien upon the individual homesitcs and any 
improvements thereon for the payment of common expenses as provided in Paragraph 
8 of this Agreement. Failure to use the common facilities shall not exempt any owner 
from liability for his share of common expenses. 
Each owner shall pay his allocated portion of common expenses for 
maintenance and operation of common areas according to an annual schedule to be 
prepared by the executive committee. Assessments for construction of new facilities costing 
in excess of $1,500 shall require the approval of 75% of the homesite owncn. This 
shall not apply in the case of reconstructing facilities destroyed through a casualty loss 
fully covered by insurance. 
Any assessment unpaid within thirty days after the due date shall bear 
interest at the rate of 10 percent. 
The executive committee shall have full discretion to prescribe the manner 
of operating and maintaining the common areas and the cash requirements for doing so. 
Every reasonable determination by the executive committee shall be final and conclusive 
as to the owncn and every reasonable expenditure shall be deemed necessary and properly 
made. 
8. Liens. 
Each monthly assessment and each special assessment shall be personal debts 
and obligations of the owner against whom they are assessed at the time assessment is 
made and shall be collectible as such. Suit to recover a money judgment for unpaid 
common expenses shall be maintainable without foreclosing or waiving the lien securing 
the same. The amount of any assessment, whether regular or special, assessed to the 
- 2 -
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owner of any homeiite, including reasonable attorney's fees, shall become a lien upon 
such homeiite and improvements and the owner's interest in common areas upon recording 
a notice of the assessment u provided by the Utah Condominium Ownership Act. 
The lien for nonpayment of common expenses shall have priority over ail 
other liens and encumbrances, recorded or unrecorded, except only: 
(a) Tax and special assessment liens, and 
(b) Enaunbrances on the homesite and owners' interest in common areas 
recorded prior to the date such notice is recorded, which by law would be a lien prior 
to subsequently recorded encumbrance. 
The lien for nonpayment of assessment may be enforced by sale or 
foreclosure of the owner's interest by the executive committee or by a bank, trust company 
or title insurance company authorized by the executive committee, such sale or foreclosure 
to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of law applicable to the exercise of 
powers of sale or foreclosure in deeds of trust or mortgages or in any manner permitted 
by law. 
9. Agreement Enforceable by City. 
This Agreement, when executed by the owners, and approved by the City 
Attorney of the City of MapJeton, Utah, shall be filed with the Utah County Recorder 
and shall be enforceable by the City of Mapleton, as provided in the Zoning Ordinance 
of the City of Mapleton. These sections permit the City to treat a breach of this Agreement 
as a violation of the Mapleton City ordinances. The City also has the right to tn:at 
a failure to maintain the common areas as a public nuisance and the City may use any 
remedy provided by law to abate such nuisance. The owners hereby specifically agree 
that the covenants set forth in this agreement may be enforced by the City should the 
owners fail to do so. 
10. Serv/cej Rendered by City. 
The owners agree that if the City of Mapleton should be hindered in 
rendering fire, police or other city services by the locked gate at the entrance t^ the 
Development or other special features of the Development, the owners shall not hold 
the City liable provided reasonable efforts have been made to furnish the service in question. 
11. Use Restrictions, 
Use of property in the Development shall be subject to the following 
provisions: 
(a) Each homesite shall be used only for a private single family residence 
and shall be occupied only by an individual family and its servants, guests, lessees or 
tenants. No homesite may be subdivided nor may an owner sell or transfer less than 
all hi* interest in his homesite and common areas. 
3" 
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(b) The common areas sha!! be used only by the owners, their families, 
guests and lessees. No commercial use of the common areas may be permitted. 
(c) All homesites and the common areas shall be kept in a clean and 
sanitary condition. No rubbish or refuse shall be allowed to accumulate. No unlawful 
use of any part of the Development shall be permitted. 
(d) No signs, notices or advertisements shall be displayed in the 
Development without the consent of the executive committee. 
12. Administrative Rules and Regulations. 
The executive committee shall have the power to adopt and establish by 
resolution such building, management and operational rules as it may deem necessary for 
the maintenance, operation, management and control of the project. The committee may, 
from time to time by resolution, alter, amend and repeal such rules. When a copy of 
any rule has been furnished to the owners, the rule shall be binding upon the owners. 
13. Amendment. 
This Agreement, the by-laws of the Association and the rules adopted by 
the executive committee may be amended by a vote of not less than three-fourths of 
the owners. Any amendment to this Agreement shall be filed for recording with the 
Utah County Recorder. 
14. Right of First Refusal. 
When an owner desires to sell his interest in the Development, he shall 
give notice to the executive committee of the owner's intention to sell. The notice shall 
include the name and address of the prospective purchaser and the price and terms of 
the proposed sale. At any time within ten days of the receipt of the notice the executive 
committee may notify the owner that the Association or a member of the Association 
elects to purchase the owner's interest at the price and on the terms specified. If the 
owner is not notified within ten days that the Association elects to purchase the owner's 
interest, the owner is free to sell to the prospective purchaser at the price and on the 
terms specified. If the owner fails to complete the sale to the designated purchaser, the 
owner shall again tender his interest to the executive committee before making any sale. 
15. Agent for Service of Process. 
Service of process upon the Association may be made by serving 
Qpnrge G. W r i g h t whose address is: 2 1 3 7 E a s t 4 0 0 N o r t h , M a p l e t o n , 
U t a h , 8 4 6 6 3 9 
F r i J a n 0 5 1 9 9 6 0 9 : 5 0 U T A H C O U N T Y R E C O R D E R S O . f E I C E 
16. Miscellaneous Provisions, 
(a) Invalid Provisions. In the event that one or more of the phrases, 
sentence*, clauses, parasnpht or subparagraph! contained in this Agreement are determined 
to be invalid or operate to render this Agreement invalid, this Instrument shall be construed 
is if such invalid phrase, sentence, clauae, paragraph or subparagraph had not been inserted 
so far as legally possible. 
(b) Interpretation. The singular, wherever used herein, shall be construed 
to Include! the plural when applicable, and a given gender shall be deemed to include 
partnerships, corporations, individuals, and men or women where necesaary and applicable. 
(c) Topical Headings, The topical headings of the paragraphs contained 
in this Agreement are for convenience only and do not define, limit or construe the contents 
of the paragraphs or of this Agreement. 
17. Waiver. 
No provisions contained in this Agreement shall be deemed to have been 
waived by rwon of any failure to enforce it, irrespective of the number of violations 
which may occur. 
18. Effective Date. 
This Agreement shall take effect on the date it is recorded in the office 
of the Utah County Recorder. 
Executed this S day of IV8O 
F r i J a n 0 5 1 9 9 6 0 9 : 5 1 UTAH COUNTY RECORDERS OF(Kl£k 
APPENDIX "B" 
Memorandum Decision, 7 May 1996 (R. 796-792) 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
CARMA B. SMITH, Clerk 
l2
*f Deputy 
9 7 ^ 7, FMh ' 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JON TRIESAULT, ELIZABETH 
TRJJESAULT, ROGER CLIVE BAKER, and 
LYNNETTE JENNIFER BAKER, 
Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants, 
vs. 
QMF, INC., WILLIAM E. CASPER, JR., 
SHIRLEY A. CASPER, GEORGE G, 
WRIGHT, JANE C. WRIGHT, and JOHN 
DOES 1-10, 
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 950400154 
DATE: May 7, 1996 
JUDGE DONALD J. EYRE 
This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider, filed on 
April 12, 1996. The Court, having received and reviewed the motion, memorandum in 
support, memorandum in opposition, and having reviewed the applicable law, now makes the 
following remarks: 
1. Upon review of its April 4, 1996 Memorandum Decision, the Court finds that 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider is the functional equivalent of a motion pursuant to U. R. C. 
P., Rule 60 (b), requesting relief from a mistaken judgment or order, and grants said motion. 
See Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son. 808 P.2d 1061, 1063-65 (Utah 1991). 
2. The Court regrets any confusion its previous memorandum decisions may have 
caused the parties in the above matter regarding issues related to standing and joinder of 
indispensable parties. 
3. The Court, in its "Ruling on Issue of Whether Plaintiffs Have Standing," dated 
January 24, 1996, was ". . .concerned with the issue of standing in this case and whether all 
the necessary parties have been included in the action" (emphasis added). The Court then 
Memorandum Decision T ~~~~ 
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entered into a discussion of joinder of persons pursuant to Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure but neglected to address the standing issue. 
4. The Court recognizes that Plaintiffs, pursuant to the recommendations of this Court, 
attempted to cure the issue regarding whether all the necessary parties have been included in 
the action by joining various parties as Defendants on February 23, 1996, when Plaintiffs 
filed an amended complaint with this Court. The Court's finding, in the Memorandum 
Decision dated April 4, 1996, that the "Plaintiffs have not joined any indispensable parties" 
was therefore a mistake. 
5. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs' joinder of indispensable parties does not cure its standing 
deficiencies. The issue of standing has always been, and still remains to be, Plaintiffs 
largest obstacle in bringing this action. It was the issue of standing that this Court attempted 
to address in its January 24, 1996 ruling. 
6. The Court noted, in its April 4, 1996 Memorandum Decision, that the homeowner's 
association would most likely have standing in regards to the above controversy and that it 
may also be possible that the homeowners could jointly have standing. It was implied that 
the Plaintiffs, by themselves, did not have standing. 
7. Standing is a Plaintiffs issue " . . . intended to assure the procedural integrity of 
judicial adjudication by requiring that the parties to a lawsuit have a sufficient interest in the 
subject matter of the dispute and sufficient adverseness that the legal and factual issues which 
must be resolved will be thoroughly explored. Terracore v. Utah Bd. of State Lands. 716 
P.2d 796 (Utah 1986). 
8. Utah has formulated an alternative test for determining standing: 
1. We first apply traditional standing criteria, which require that (a) the 
interests of the parties be adverse, and (b) the parties seeking relief have a legally 
protectible interest in the controversy. Plaintiff must be able to show that he has 
suffered some distinct and palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in the 
outcome of the legal dispute. 
Memorandum Decision ?F-
2. If the plaintiff has no standing under the first step, then he may have 
standing if no one has a greater interest than he and if the issue is unlikely to be 
raised at all if the plaintiff is denied standing. 
3. In unique cases, standing may be established by a showing that the issues 
raised by the plaintiff are of great public importance and ought to be judicially 
resolved. 
See Terracore v. Utah Bd. of State Lands. 716 P.2d 796, 798-9 (Utah 1988); 
Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake. 702 P.2d 451, 454 (Utah 1985); Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 
1145, 1148-50 (Utah 1983). 
9. For purposes of addressing the standing issue, the Court finds that Defendant QMF, 
Inc. made several land transactions in Mapleton, Utah. Some of the property was sold in 
accordance with a planned unit development (PUD) which QMF, Inc. established with the 
Mapleton City Council and Planning Commission. As part of the PUD, approximately 2.0 
acres were set aside as common ground as part of the approval of the plat for the PUD. 
QMF, Inc. wanted to amend the PUD boundary to reacquire part of the common ground to 
be combined with other land of QMF, Inc. to create a new lot to be sold. In exchange, 
QMF, Inc. would extend the actual acreage of certain lots of the PUD by an equivalent 
amount of land used from the common ground. The Defendants obtained all the landowner's 
signatures of authorization from them for approval on the amended PUD in accordance with 
the requirement of the Mapleton City Council, except for the signature of Stephen E. 
Hechtle; the predecessor in interest to Plaintiffs Triesault and Baker. The PUD was 
amendable by a vote of not less than three-fourths of the owners. Subsequently, each 
property owner quit claimed their lot to QMF, Inc. The newly created lot was sold and the 
proceeds from the sale were used for services of QMF, Inc., and towards obligations of 
QMF, Inc. to the homeowner's association. 
10. Plaintiffs initiated this action claiming an interest in the value of the common areas 
of the PUD, and claiming Defendant Wright made fraudulent representations in obtaining 
Plaintiffs' signatures on the quit claim deeds to QMF, Inc. Plaintiffs did not obtain, nor do 
they have any authority to act for or in behalf of the homeowner's association. All alleged 
representations concerning QMF, Inc. made by Defendant Wright were to the homeowner's 
association, and not each landowner individually. 
11. Additionally, filed with the Court are the affidavits of Michael G. Rieker, George 
G. Wright, Jane C. Wright, Carol P. Rieker, William G. Schwartz, Jan Thorpe, Richard V. 
Thorpe, Marilyn S. Peterson, Gary B. Peterson, Paul J. Hurst, Dorthy J. Hurst, Stanley 
Wayne Curtis, and Patricia H. Clark who all indicate that they are members of the 
Homowner's Association of the Quiet Meadow Farms PUD; that they do not desire to have 
this claim asserted on their behalf or on behalf of the Homeowners Association; and that they 
desire that the Plaintiffs claim be dismissed. 
12. For various reasons Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring this matter. They have 
not suffered some distinct and palpable injury giving them a personal stake in the outcome of 
this dispute. According to the "Quiet Meadow Farms Planned Unit Development 
Agreement", it is the "Quiet Meadow Farms Owners Association," through its "Executive 
Committee," that conducts the business relating to the maintenance and management of the 
common areas at issue. Additionally, the Plaintiffs Triesault and Baker have not suffered 
any distinct and palpable injury as .22 of an acre was deeded back to Lot 4 as laid out in the 
amended PUD. Plaintiffs are merely trying to assert a claim that is best brought by the 
homeowner's association. 
13. Under the second step in the above standing analysis, the homeowner's association 
clearly has a greater interest than any of the Plaintiffs in the above matter. 
14. Finally, the Court finds that the issues presented in this matter are not such as to 
establish standing because they are of great public importance and ought to be judicially 
resolved. 
15. Based on the above, Plaintiffs have not established their standing to bring this 
action and this case should be dismissed. 
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793 
Counsel for Defendant, Richard D. Bradford, is to prepare, within 15 days of the 
date hereof, an order consistent with the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing 
counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. 
Dated at Provo, Utah this 7th day of May, 1996. 
\ BY\THE COURT: 
JUDGET>ONALD 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this 7th day of May, 1996: 
RICHARD D. BRADFORD 
389 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
M. DAYLE JEFFS 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
THOMAS W. SEILER 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo, Utah 84603-1266 
CARMA B. SMITH 
CLERK OF THE C 
Deputy Clerk 
Memorandum Decision -5-
APPENDIX "C" 
Memorandum Decision, 28 Oct. 1996 (R. 904-899) 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JON TRIESAULT, ELIZABETH 
TRJJESAULT, ROGER CLIVE BARKER 
and LYNNETTE JENNIFER BAKER, 
Plaintiffs/Counterclaim 
Defendants, 
vs. 
QMF, INC., WILLIAM E CASPER, JR, 
SHIRLEY A CASPER, GEORGE G 
WRIGHT, JANE C WRIGHT and JOHN 
DOES 1-10, 
Defendants/Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 950400154 
DATE: October 23, 1996 
JUDGE DONALD J. EYRE 
This matter came before the Court on October 17, 1996. The Court, having 
received and reviewed the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Counterclaim, 
Motion for Order Vacating Dismissal of Personal Claims, and Motion to Assess Costs, as 
well as Defendants' Motion to Tax Costs, memoranda in support, memoranda in opposition, 
reply memoranda, having heard oral arguments, and having reviewed the applicable law, 
now makes the following findings and conclusions: 
1. This Court finds that the Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants filed their 
Complaint on March 19, 1995. In their Complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged they suffered an 
injury when a portion of common ground within their Planned Unit Development ("PUD") 
was sold by Defendants. 
2. This Court finds that the Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants filed a lis pendens 
on March 14, 1996 on the common ground that was at issue in their Complaint. 
3. On September 1, 1995, the Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs filed a 
Counterclaim against the Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants alleging damages suffered as a 
consequence of the lis pendens; in particular, the Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs alleged 
slander of title and bad faith. 
4. In its Memorandum Decision dated May 7, 1996, this Court found that the 
Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants did not have standing to bring forth the claim for injury 
stated in their Complaint. 
5. Accordingly, on May 28, 1996, this Court entered an Order of Dismissal, 
which dismissed the Plaintiffs'/Counterclaim Defendants' remaining claims. 
6. This Court finds that the purpose for recording a lis pendens is to "give 
constructive notice of the pendency of proceedings which might be derogatory to the owner's 
title or right of possession; its only foundation is the action filed, and it has no existence 
independent of that." Hansen v. Kohler. 550 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1976). In addition, this 
Court finds that recording a lis pendens "is in effect a republication of the pleadings in the 
underlying action; as such it is an absolutely privileged publication, and cannot become the 
basis of an action for slander of title." Id. 
7. Moreover, this Court finds that, even if lis pendens permitted an action for 
slander of title, the Counterclaim Plaintiffs could not establish slander of title in the present 
case. "To prove slander of title, a claimant must prove (1) there was a publication of a 
slanderous statement disparaging claimant's title, (2) the statement was false, (3) the 
statement was made with malice, and (4) the statement caused actual or special damages." 
Gillmor v. Cummings. 904 P.2d 703, 707 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), citing First Security Bank 
v. Banberrv Crossing. 780 P.2d 1253, 1256-57 (Utah 1989). The Counterclaim Plaintiffs 
have presented no evidence which clearly establishes that the Counterclaim Defendant acted 
maliciously. Filing a lis pendens action is appropriate "[i]n any action affecting the title to, 
or the right of possession of, real property. . ." UCA § 78-40-2 (1996). In its lis pendens, 
the Counterclaim Defendants stated that "[o]ne or more of the Defendants claims ownership 
- C O - Q' <-* ^ \y *J > ; 
or control of said real property." This Court finds that a claimant's disputed interest in real 
property, whether or not mistaken, does not rise to the level of malice required by the 
statute. 
8. This Court finds that, to award attorney's fees to a prevailing party in a civil 
matter, a Court must find that "the action or defense to the action was without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith," with certain exceptions. UCA § 78-27-56 (1996). 
Consequently, to award attorney's fees, the prevailing party must demonstrate that the claim 
was frivolous, or that it had no basis in law or fact, and that the action was not brought in 
good faith. Jeschke v. Willis. 811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
9. Furthermore, this Court finds that an action is without merit if it has no legal 
or factual basis. However, this Court also finds that a case without merit may still be in 
good faith provided the claimant honestly belives the action is appropriate, and has not 
initiated the action in an effort to hinder, delay, defraud or take advantage of another. Cady 
v. Johnson. 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983). 
10. This Court finds that the Counterclaim Defendants, in filing their Complaint, 
had an honest belief that doing so was appropriate, whether or not that belief was erroneous. 
Therefore, this Court finds that Counterclaim Defendents claim was neither frivolous nor in 
bad faith to the extent required by statute for awarding attorney's fees. 
11. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs'/Counterclaim Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Counterclaim is GRANTED. 
12. This Court finds that, in cases where a court has not made a final decision or 
order on all the claims or rights and liabilities of all the parties involved in a claim, those 
decisions "shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or 
other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment 
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." URCP 54(b) 
(1996). 
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13. This Court finds that: 
[U]nit owners may, by an affirmative vote of at least three-fourths of such unit 
owners . . . elect to sell or otherwise dispose of the property. Such action shall be 
binding upon all unit owners and it shall thereupon become the duty of every unit 
owner to execute and deliver such instruments and to perform all acts as in manner 
and form may be necessary to effect the sale." 
UCA § 57-8-32 (1996). Therefore, this Court finds that in the present case, the affirmative 
vote of at least three-fourths of the property owners in the Quiet Meadow Farms PUD was 
necessary to bind all unit owners of the property at issue. Although no official vote was 
taken, the Court received affidavits from eight of the ten property owners, who stated that 
they neither wished to join in Plaintiffs' claim, nor have the claim pursued on their behalf. 
This Court finds that, because at least three-fourths of the property owners agreed to the 
property disposal, the Court accepts the affidavits as affirmative votes which effectively bind 
all property owners, including the Plaintiffs. 
14. In its Memorandum Decision signed on May 7, 1996, this Court held that the 
Plaintiffs did not have standing to bring their claim because they had not "suffered some 
distinct and palpable injury giving them a personal stake in the outcome of this dispute." 
In addition, this Court found that the Quiet Meadow Farms Owners Association, through its 
Executive Committee, conducted the business relating to the maintenance and management of 
the common area at issue. As such, the Owners Association was the appropriate party to 
bring forth a claim. 
15. Furthermore, this Court finds that the Plaintiffs, by their own account, do not 
request monetary gain as an outcome of the lawsuit. On the contrary, the Plaintiffs have 
stated their interest in having the common ground at issue returned. Depo. of Jon Triesault, 
p. 36; Depo. of Roger Baker, p. 20. However, the Amended PUD deeded back .22 of an 
acre to Lot 4. This Court has difficulty in finding an injury where the common ground has 
been disposed of in compliance with the applicable statute, and where additional property has 
been deeded back to compensate for that disposal. 
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16. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs Motion for Order Vacating Dismissal of 
Personal Claims is DENIED. 
17. This Court finds that the Defendants filed a Motion to Assess Costs on July 
23, 1996, and that Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Tax Costs on August 19, 1996. This Court 
orders each party requesting costs to submit affidavits outlining their costs, based upon and 
in accordance with this Memorandum Decision and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to 
this Court for approval. 
18. In conclusion, this Court notes that, according to the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rule 41, dismissals based on lack of jursidiction are without prejudice unless 
otherwise specified. Therefore, in its Order of Dismissal dated May 28, 1996, the order 
should reflect that that dismissal was without prejudice. 
Counsel for Plaintiffs is to prepare, within 15 days of the date hereof, an order 
consistent with the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to 
form prior to submission to the Court for signature. 
&*> day\of October, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
Dated at Provo, Utah this 
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